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To date, the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) has focused its attention on prosecuting 
governmental and military leaders. This article uses the recent communication submitted to the 
ICC seeking the extension of the Office of the Prosecutor’s ongoing preliminary investigation in 
Colombia as a framework to explore whether the ICC should expand its focus to include atrocity 
crimes committed by corporations and their employees. The article specifically addresses the 
questions raised in the communication regarding the financial involvement of Chiquita Brands 
International Inc (‘Chiquita’) with paramilitary forces in Colombia between 2002 and 2004. The 
article also examines the current arguments in favour of extending the ICC’s criminal liability to 
include corporations and highlights the shortcomings of those sentiments above and beyond the 
fact that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly excludes such liability. It 
also discusses the modes of individual liability contained in arts 25(3)(c) and (d), and analyses 
whether employees of Chiquita could be exposed to prosecution under either provision. The 
article concludes that the ICC should make greater efforts to investigate and prosecute corporate 
actors for their involvement in human rights abuses. However, it cautions that the facts as they 
relate to Chiquita suggest that such efforts should not be concentrated on this case as it is 
unlikely that an investigation into this case will result in a successful prosecution. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
To date, the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) has focused its attention on 
prosecuting governmental and military leaders for crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction. However, three non-governmental organisations recently submitted 
an art 15 communication to the ICC (‘the Communication’), seeking the 
expansion of the Office of the Prosecutor’s ongoing preliminary investigation in 
Colombia to include corporate officials of Chiquita Brands International Inc 
(‘Chiquita’).1 The Communication alleges that Chiquita corporate officials made 
repeated payments to subsidiaries of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas 
                                                 
 1 International Human Rights Clinic, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo and 
International Federation for Human Rights, ‘The Contribution of Chiquita Corporate 
Officials to Crimes Against Humanity in Colombia: Article 15 Communication to the 
International Criminal Court’ (Article 15 Communication to the International Criminal 
Court, 18 May 2017) <https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_chiquita.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/6WNS-HZUE> (‘The Communication’). 
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de Colombia (‘AUC’), despite the fact that those officials were aware that the 
groups were committing crimes against humanity.2 The corporate officials 
implicated are ‘former and current senior executives, high-ranking officers, 
employees, and board members of Chiquita’.3 If the ICC were to accept these 
allegations and enlarge its investigation it would represent an expansion of the 
types of crimes the ICC has concerned itself with and put corporate officials on 
notice that they can no longer involve themselves with organisations that commit 
atrocity crimes without repercussions. This in turn will serve the ICC’s 
overarching goal of ending impunity. 
This article addresses this issue in three parts. First, it describes the activities 
that Chiquita has admitted to engaging in and discusses how they connect to the 
crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the AUC. It will also attempt to 
contextualise these claims within the ICC’s larger preliminary investigation of 
Colombia. Secondly, this article examines what charges, if any, might be brought 
as a result of Chiquita’s activities. This involves an analysis of whether charges 
can be brought directly against corporations at the ICC and an examination of the 
current arguments in favour of allowing such jurisdiction. The article also 
examines how the crimes allegedly committed by the AUC and its forces might 
be ascribed to Chiquita and its employees. Thirdly, the article concludes that the 
ICC should expand its activities to include investigations and prosecutions into 
corporations and their employees, but will caution that this case involving 
Chiquita might not be the best candidate in which to initiate such an expansion. 
II THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST CHIQUITA 
The ICC began its preliminary examination of Colombia in June 2004.4 The 
examination was for the purpose of determining whether war crimes or crimes 
against humanity had been committed in Colombia during more than fifty years 
of armed conflict between government led military forces, a variety of different 
left-wing guerrilla organisations including Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo (‘FARC-EP’); the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (‘ELN’); and paramilitary groups referred to collectively as the AUC.5 
Although the preliminary examination began in 2004, it was partially limited in 
temporal scope by an art 124 declaration made by the Colombian government 
when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’) was 
ratified in 2002.6 Article 124 permits states ratifying the Rome Statute to declare 
that, for a period of seven years after the ratification, the ratifying state does not 
accept the ICC’s jurisdiction for war crimes as defined in art 8. Article 124 
declarations are limited to the extent that the alleged war crimes being excluded 
must have been committed by nationals of the state or within the state’s own 
                                                 
 2 Ibid.  
 3 Ibid.  
 4 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities (Report, 14 November 2016) 52 [231] (‘Preliminary Examination Activities 
Report’).  
 5 Ibid 52 [234], 53 [237]–[238].  
 6 United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and 
Reservations (20 July 2018) United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mt
dsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en> archived at <https://perma.cc/2ZND-C46B>.  
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territory.7 Therefore, the ICC’s jurisdiction in Colombia extends to art 6 and art 7 
crimes occurring at any time after the Rome Statute came into force in Colombia 
on 1 November 2002, and to art 8 crimes committed after 1 November 2009.8 
The Office of the Prosecutor issued an interim report on its preliminary 
investigation into Colombia in 2012. At that time, the Prosecutor concluded that 
a reasonable basis existed to believe that guerrilla and paramilitary groups had 
committed crimes against humanity and war crimes during the relevant temporal 
periods.9 Although many of the alleged crimes were ascribed to members of 
FARC-EP and ELN, the investigation also produced evidence that AUC also 
committed crimes against humanity prior to being disbanded in 2006.10 The 
report identifies at least six members of the AUC that were convicted of crimes 
committed within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, including convictions for 
murder, attempted murder, abduction, forced displacement and child 
recruitment.11 
Chiquita, a multinational corporation headquartered in the United States, is 
one of the largest worldwide distributors of bananas and, until 2004, operated a 
wholly owned subsidiary in Colombia called CI Bananos de Exportación SA 
(‘Banadex’).12 Chiquita admitted, in a factual proffer filed in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia during the pendency of a criminal action brought 
against Chiquita by the US government, that it made payments to the AUC 
between 1997 and 2004 and continued to do so even after learning that the AUC 
was committing human rights violations.13 The factual proffer, signed by 
representatives of Chiquita, is the result of a plea agreement between Chiquita 
and the US government and concedes that, had the case gone to trial, the facts 
contained in the proffer could have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.14 
Between 1997 and 2004, Chiquita, through Banadex, made monthly payments 
to the AUC totalling over USD1.7 million.15 Chiquita recorded these payments 
as being ‘“security payments” or payments for “security” or “security services”’, 
when in fact the payments were to protect Chiquita’s employees and its property 
from harm threatened by the AUC if the payments were not made.16 Chiquita 
was aware, no later than September 2000, that its payments were going to the 
AUC and that the AUC was a violent paramilitary group.17 On 10 September 
2001, the US government designated the AUC as a ‘Foreign Terrorist 
Organization’ for allegedly having committed ‘numerous acts of terrorism’, 
including massacres resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, forced 
                                                 
 7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 124 (‘Rome Statute’).  
 8 See ibid art 126; Preliminary Examination Activities Report, above n 4, 52 [233].  
 9 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Situation in Colombia: Interim 
Report (Interim Report, 14 November 2012) 2–3 [5]–[6] (‘Colombian Interim Report’).  
 10 Ibid 22–3 [71]–[73], 52–3 [168]. See also at 23 [72]–[74].  
 11 Ibid.  
 12 United States of America, ‘Factual Proffer’, Submission in United States of America v 
Chiquita Brands International Inc, No 07-cr-00055, 19 March 2007 (DC Cir, 2007) [1]–[2]. 
 13 Ibid [19], [22], [28].  
 14 Ibid 17. 
 15 Ibid [19].  
 16 Ibid [21], [23].  
 17 Ibid [22].  
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displacements and kidnappings.18 Chiquita continued to make payments to the 
AUC even after becoming aware that the AUC had been declared a Foreign 
‘Terrorist Organization’ and despite the fact that Chiquita had received legal 
advice, both from outside counsel and the Department of Justice, that it was 
illegal to continue to pay the AUC.19 Chiquita made its last payment to the AUC 
on 4 February 2004 before divesting itself of Banadex in June 2004.20 The AUC 
disbanded in 2006, pursuant to a demobilisation agreement with the Colombian 
government, although some factions reorganised under different names 
following the official demobilisation.21 The Communication alleges that 
Chiquita employees, by making payments to the AUC and continuing to make 
those payments even after learning that the AUC was committing ‘widespread 
and systematic crimes’ in Colombia, contributed to those crimes in a manner 
sufficient to incur criminal liability under the Rome Statute.22 
III WHO CAN BE CHARGED? 
The preliminary question to be addressed is who can be charged at the ICC 
for the alleged criminal activity being attributed to Chiquita. The Rome Statute 
limits criminal responsibility to natural persons (ie individuals) and does not 
permit corporations to be charged with crimes falling under the statute.23 This 
echoes the finding of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that 
‘[c]rimes against International Law are committed by men not abstract 
entities’.24 As a result, employees of Chiquita, but not Chiquita itself, could 
potentially be charged with crimes arising out of the corporation’s involvement 
with the AUC in Colombia. Although this outcome may be disappointing to 
some, it would still represent a departure for the ICC as it would constitute the 
first time the ICC made any effort to hold corporate actors accountable for 
atrocity crimes. The ICC would signal a willingness to broaden its fight against 
impunity by expanding its reach beyond governmental and military actors. 
A debate surrounding whether the ICC should be able to prosecute 
corporations has been going on since the negotiations at the conference in Rome 
                                                 
 18 Colin L Powell, ‘Designation of the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’ (Press 
Release, 10 September 2001) <https://2001–
2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4852.htm>.  
 19 United States of America, ‘Factual Proffer’, Submission in United States of America v 
Chiquita Brands International Inc, No 07-cr-00055, 19 March 2007 (DC Cir, 2007) [1]–[2]. 
 20 Ibid [2], [87]; Cliff Peale, ‘Chiquita Sells Colombia Unit: Move Is from Harvester to 
Marketer’, The Cincinnati Enquirer (online), 12 June 2004 
<http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/06/12/biz_biz1achiq.html> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/RUH7-CTZZ>. 
 21 See Amnesty International, ‘Colombia — Fear and Intimidation: The Dangers of Human 
Rights Work’ (Research Report, 6 September 2006) 6 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/72000/amr230332006en.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/94FU-QNPE>.  
 22  The Communication, above n 1, [14], [18].  
 23 Rome Statute art 25. See also Norman Farrell, ‘Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate 
Actors: Some Lessons from the International Tribunals’ (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 873, 874; Michael J Kelly, ‘Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide under 
International Law’ (2012) 6 Harvard Law and Policy Review 339, 346; Harmen van der 
Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the 
Possibilities’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 43, 44.  
 24 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 (1948) vol 22, 466.  
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produced the Rome Statute. A working paper was introduced during the 
negotiations that would have extended the ICC’s jurisdiction to include juridical 
persons, defined as ‘a corporation whose concrete, real or dominant objective is 
seeking private profit or benefit’.25 That proposal was ultimately rejected despite 
many national delegations believing it to be one of great merit.26 Reasons for not 
incorporating corporate liability into the Rome Statute include: concerns that 
providing for corporate criminal liability would remove focus from individual 
responsibility; worries that prosecuting corporations could result in great 
difficulties in obtaining evidence; and most importantly, that the lack of common 
standards in national jurisdictions about corporate criminal liability, including 
the non-recognition of the idea by a number of nations, would make the principle 
of complementarity ineffective and overload the ICC with corporate cases.27 
Despite the fact that this proposal was rejected and corporate criminal liability 
was not incorporated into the Rome Statute, commentators continue to advocate 
for increased corporate criminal liability in international criminal law, some 
going so far as to call for the amendment of the Rome Statute.28  
There are two main arguments in favour of imposing criminal liability against 
corporations at the ICC. One is of general applicability to all of international 
criminal law, while the other specifically addresses an issue with the practice of 
the ICC. The first argument suggests that an impunity gap exists when 
corporations are not prosecuted for their involvement in atrocity crimes.29 
Essentially, there is a concern that because criminal liability at the modern 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals is limited to 
individuals, corporations, as entities, are relatively free to commit atrocity crimes 
without fear of punishment. Although national laws exist that impose liability on 
corporations and/or their individual employees they have not proven to be 
sufficient to deter corporate participation in human rights abuses. Many 
individual states are often unwilling or unable to adequately regulate human 
rights abuses committed by corporations within their jurisdiction.30 In fact, 
national unwillingness or inability to address crimes committed by corporations 
is what has driven efforts to provide for corporate criminal liability in 
                                                 
 25 Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Working Paper on Article 23, Paragraphs 5 and 6, UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/REV.2 (3 July 1998) [5]. 
 26 William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2016) 566.  
 27 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013–16) vol 
1, 145 (citations omitted).  
 28 Nadia Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law: The New TV SAL and 
Akhbar Beirut SAL Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2015) 13 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 313, 319–20; Kathryn Haigh, ‘Extending the International 
Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction to Corporations: Overcoming Complementarity Concerns’ 
(2008) 14 Australian Journal of Human Rights 199, 200; Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘A 
Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal 
Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 909, 916–17.  
 29 Bernaz, above n 28, 319.  
 30 Haigh, above n 28, 200; Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Corporations and the International Criminal 
Court: The Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 115, 
146–7.  
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international law.31 Reasons for this unwillingness or inability include: a lack of 
financial or legal resources to properly investigate and prosecute alleged crimes; 
a lack of jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes allegedly committed by 
multinational corporations in more than one country; the fear that corporations 
will relocate their operations or redirect foreign direct investment away from 
countries attempting to investigate or prosecute; the participation of government 
officials in the crimes alleged against the corporation; or a preference for 
financial investment over the enforcement of human rights norms.32 It is thought 
that the best way to overcome states’ inaction in this area is to create 
international jurisdiction over these crimes, and that the ICC is the best venue in 
which to do so. 
Using international criminal mechanisms to prosecute corporations has the 
potential to close this impunity gap by promoting the deterrent function of 
criminal law. Those corporations that participate in atrocity crimes could be 
specifically deterred from doing so by the knowledge that their actions will have 
criminal consequences.33 Specific deterrence is thought to prevent atrocity 
crimes to the extent that the public stigma and reputational injury that 
accompanies any suggestion of an individual or group’s involvement in such 
crimes acts as a sufficient disincentive.34 It has been suggested that corporations 
are especially susceptible to this sort of deterrence because they are meant to 
function as rational actors whose decisions are not emotionally or socially 
motivated.35 However, corporate decisions, while made on behalf of the 
corporation, are made either individually or collectively by human beings. This 
means that subjective human morality cannot be entirely removed from the 
equation. Further, to the extent that a corporation’s decision is a rational one, 
made on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis, it is entirely possible that the 
rational decision will be to commit human rights abuses as doing so will be in 
the best financial interests of the corporation. 
International criminal prosecutions of corporations for human rights abuses 
could also act as a general deterrent. General deterrence, also referred to as 
expressive deterrence, operates on the theory that punishing the perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes will ‘dissuade for ever, others who may be tempted in the future 
to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international community 
shall not tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights’.36 This is achieved through a twostep process: first, it transforms 
                                                 
 31 Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘Regulating Corporations under 
International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again’ 
(2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 725, 741.  
 32 Ibid 728; Kremnitzer, above n 28, 916–17; Haigh, above n 28, 200; Kyriakakis, ‘The 
Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare’, above n 30, 146–7.  
 33 Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Corporations before International Criminal Courts: Implications for the 
International Criminal Justice Project’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 221, 
236.  
 34 Robert D Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the 
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law’ (2007) 43 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 39, 73–4.  
 35 Kyriakakis, ‘Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project’, above n 33, 236–7.  
 36 Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgement and Sentence) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999) [456] (‘Rutagana 
Judgement’).  
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‘popular conceptions of correct behavior’; and secondly, it promotes ‘the gradual 
internalization of values that encourage habitual conformity with the law’.37 
Much as with specific deterrence, the belief is that the stigmatising effects of 
criminal prosecutions for atrocity crimes, and the potential financial losses 
associated with that stigma, will convince corporations to comply with the law so 
as not to negatively affect its business. 
To the extent that prosecuting corporations has a general deterrent effect, it is 
thought to be experienced by the individuals running corporations and not the 
corporation itself. The influence of criminal sanctions on a corporation has been 
described as occurring in a ‘twice mediated way’.38 The consequences of 
sanctioning a corporation for its actions are felt by the individuals controlling the 
corporation who then take steps to change how the corporation operates so as to 
avoid future sanctions.39 This is seen as creating an extra step to enforcement, 
particularly where the individuals making the decisions on behalf of corporations 
to participate in atrocity crimes are already exposed to liability for their 
actions.40 To prosecute and punish individuals and corporations for the same 
actions is redundant, particularly when the actions of the corporation were being 
determined by the decisions of the individuals. Therefore, the current practice at 
the ICC imposes sufficient liability on corporations because it holds accountable 
the individual decision makers. 
It is argued in response that sanctioning both the corporation and the 
individuals controlling the corporation is the only way to successfully deter the 
commission of future atrocity crimes.41 Prosecuting and punishing the 
corporation directly will motivate the corporation to better monitor its actions 
and hopefully lead to a change in corporate culture and will promote different 
behaviour in the future.42 Prosecuting the corporation also guarantees that 
responsibility for atrocity crimes will be properly apportioned, particularly in 
instances where individual accountability is impossible. These instances can 
include when the culpable individual cannot be identified or located or when the 
corporation’s actions cumulatively constitute a crime but the actions of any one 
individual do not.43 Corporate criminal liability minimises these issues and 
results in greater overall accountability. However, the incorporation of corporate 
criminal liability into international criminal law does not suggest that individuals 
should no longer be held responsible for atrocity crimes that can be attributed to 
the corporation. Even if corporate liability is recognised, it does not change the 
                                                 
 37 Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary 
on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 737, 747. 
See also Eric Blumenson, ‘The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, 
and Punishment at the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 801, 828.  
 38 Thomas Weigend, ‘Societas Delinquere non Potest?’ (2008) 6 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 927, 941.  
 39 Ibid.  
 40 Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, ‘Natural Persons, Legal Entities, and Corporate Criminal 
Liability under the Rome Statute’ (2016) 20 UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 391, 421.  
 41 Caroline Kaeb, ‘The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal 
Law’ (2016) 49 George Washington International Law Review 351, 382–3.  
 42 Kyriakakis, ‘The Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare’, above n 30, 149.  
 43 Ibid 148; Kremnitzer, above n 28, 913.  
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fact that individual accountability remains the focus of international criminal 
law.44 Further, corporate liability, without individual liability, could lead the 
individual decision-maker to enact corporate practices that will further his or her 
own interests without concern for the effect of those actions on the corporation.45 
Therefore, ensuring that corporations do not operate with impunity requires an 
all-inclusive approach with liability extending to both the corporation and the 
individual. This reasoning is persuasive and supports the idea that corporate 
criminal liability has a place in international criminal law. 
Whether the ICC is the appropriate venue to pursue corporate criminal 
liability remains to be seen. The complementarity principle represents a 
significant obstacle to imposing criminal liability on corporations at the ICC. 
The argument in favour of allowing corporate criminal liability at the ICC 
alleges that the proliferation of international agreements imposing criminal 
liability on corporations and the increasing number of states that have adopted 
domestic laws designed to criminalise corporate behaviour have alleviated many 
of the complementarity concerns voiced when the Rome Statute was being 
negotiated.46 The complementarity principle is introduced in the preamble to the 
Rome Statute, and reiterated in art 1. Both provisions emphasise that the ICC’s 
jurisdiction will be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.47 The 
principle is made operative through art 17, which stands for the proposition that 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is meant to complement domestic criminal jurisdiction 
and that cases will be inadmissible before the ICC unless the relevant state is 
‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.48 
The purpose of the principle is to ensure that the ICC will fill any impunity gap 
caused by a state’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute, while also preventing 
it from intruding on a state’s proper exercise of its domestic criminal 
jurisdiction.49 
The concern surrounding complementarity as it relates to corporate criminal 
liability involves whether the ICC could prosecute corporate actions occurring in 
the territory of a state that does not criminalise corporate behaviour on the 
grounds that not criminalising those activities makes it unable to prosecute 
within the meaning of art 17.50 States that do not impose corporate criminal 
liability are apprehensive that such an interpretation of art 17 could represent an 
infringement on their sovereignty by effectively imposing criminal liability on 
corporations even when national laws do not.51 Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute 
defines ‘inability’ as a situation where, ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out 
                                                 
 44 See Elies van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 6.  
 45 Kaeb, above n 41, 383.  
 46 Kremnitzer, above n 28, 910; Haigh, above n 28, 201, 204; Weigend, above n 38, 928; 
Kaeb, above n 41, 351–3, 381.  
 47 Rome Statute Preamble, art 1.  
 48 Rome Statute art 17(1)(a).  
 49 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013–16) vol 
3, 269. 
 50 Haigh, above n 28, 204.  
 51 Ibid 204–5.  
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its proceedings’.52 Antonio Cassese suggested that inability also encompasses 
situations in which a national legal system is unable to prosecute an accused, ‘not 
because of a collapse or malfunctioning of the judicial system, but on account of 
legislative impediments’, citing amnesty laws and statutes of limitations as 
examples of the sort of legislative impediments within his contemplation.53 
Joanna Kyriakakis builds on Cassese’s position by arguing that the non-existence 
of laws endowing courts with legal competence over corporations also represents 
a legislative impediment, resulting in the unavailability of domestic courts, 
producing an inability to prosecute.54 In the language of the ICC, states that do 
not impose criminal liability on corporations are unable to prosecute due to the 
unavailability of the domestic court system, leaving the ICC free to bring charges 
against corporations. 
More states have adopted domestic corporate criminal liability since the Rome 
Statute was concluded in 1998.55 This suggests to some that the issue of allowing 
for corporate criminal liability at the ICC should be re-examined.56 However, 
even if some states have changed their domestic laws to include corporate 
criminal liability, others have not.57 Further, although more states have adopted 
some form of domestic corporate criminal liability, there remains significant 
disagreement amongst those domestic laws as to how and when corporations can 
be held criminally liable. Greater agreement between states about how to 
implement corporate criminal liability would be necessary before the 
complementarity concerns can be properly overcome. The lack of recognised 
international standards about corporate criminal liability, coupled with the fact 
that some nations still do not impose any form of criminal liability against 
corporations, continues to make the complementarity principle ‘unworkable’.58 
While the complementarity concerns may be diminished, they have not been 
eliminated and still remain too substantial to permit the expansion of the Rome 
Statute to include corporate criminal liability.59 
Supporters of imposing corporate liability at the ICC recognise that this 
complementarity concern still exists and, as a result, have tried to find a way 
around it. One suggestion has been to create an exception to corporate liability 
under which corporations that are incorporated in states that do not criminalise 
corporate behaviour will be excluded from liability at the ICC.60 This proposal 
should be given short shrift. An exception that shields corporations from liability 
based on where they are incorporated or located would only encourage 
corporations to relocate to those states that do not impose corporate criminal 
liability. In turn, nations that currently hold corporations criminally liable for 
                                                 
 52 Rome Statute art 17(3).  
 53 Antonio Cassese et al, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
ed, 2013) 297.  
 54 Kyriakakis, ‘The Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare’, above n 30, 127.  
 55 Haigh, above n 28, 204.  
 56 Ibid 201; Kaeb, above n 41, 381.  
 57 Schabas, above n 26, 564; Kai Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’ in 
Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2016) 979, 986.  
 58 Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’, above n 57, 986.  
 59 Ibid.  
 60 Haigh, above n 28, 211; Wattad, above n 40, 418.  
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their actions would be disinclined from doing so to prevent corporations from 
moving their bases of operations. It could also lead states party to the Rome 
Statute that hold corporations accountable for their criminal actions to leave, or 
threaten to leave, the ICC, much as some African nations have done over the 
issue of head of state immunity.61 Ultimately, an exception like the one described 
above would have the tendency to diminish, rather than increase, the 
enforcement of criminal liability against corporations.  
Even if the complementarity issue could be avoided in this way, one 
significant practical concern that has largely gone unaddressed is how the ICC 
will convince a corporation to participate in the proceedings against it. Currently, 
the Rome Statute prevents the ICC from progressing past the investigation stage 
without the accused appearing before the ICC. Article 60 describes the ‘[i]nitial 
proceedings before the Court’ and requires that the accused be informed of the 
charges following their surrender or voluntary appearance.62 As a corporation 
cannot be arrested, one accused of atrocity crimes could only appear following 
the issuance of a summons. If the corporation refuses to appear, which seems 
likely, the case will be stymied because there is no statutory provision permitting 
trial to commence in the absence of the accused.63 It might be possible to arrest 
an individual corporate official and have him or her stand in for the corporation. 
However, if the corporate official refused to assume the identity of the 
corporation for trial it is difficult to see how the ICC could force an individual to 
represent a corporation solely based on his or her employment. Therefore, unless 
the corporation agrees to voluntarily appear for trial, there is no way to 
adjudicate the crimes alleged against it. 
It is difficult to envision any situation in which an accused corporation would 
voluntarily agree to appear at the ICC so that it could be tried for committing 
atrocity crimes. As a result, it would be left to the state in which the implicated 
corporation is registered or has its corporate offices to try and compel the 
corporation to participate. This approach has significant shortcomings, not the 
least of which is that states that are unwilling to try corporations in their own 
domestic jurisdictions will likely be equally unwilling to oblige those same 
corporations to voluntarily appear before the ICC. Further, a corporation 
concerned about the stigma resulting from being accused of human rights 
violations will be even less inclined to involve itself in a process that could lead 
to its conviction for those crimes. Therefore, even if the ICC were to amend its 
                                                 
 61 See, eg, United Nations Secretary-General, South Africa: Withdrawal (19 October 2016) 
United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.786.2016-ENG.PDF> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/PH8T-LK2Z>; United Nations Secretary-General, Burundi: Withdrawal 
(27 October 2016) United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/cn/2016/cn.805.2016-eng.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/W2KU-BEMG>; United Nations Secretary-General, Gambia: Withdrawal 
(10 November 2016) United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.862.2016-Eng.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/VMC2-YPR6>. See also Patrick Wintour, ‘African Exodus from ICC 
Must Be Stopped, Says Kofi Annan’ The Guardian (online), 18 November 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/african-exodus-international-criminal-
court-kofi-annan> archived at <https://perma.cc/D8PB-Y8CW>. 
 62 Rome Statute art 60(1).  
 63 See ibid art 63.  
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statute so that it could charge corporations with crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction, it is highly unlikely that it would actually result in any trials. 
Ultimately, it is immaterial whether it is advisable to permit the ICC to 
conduct prosecutions against corporations. As currently written, the Rome 
Statute does not allow corporations to be tried before the ICC.64 The focus must 
be on whether employees of Chiquita are exposed to liability for their 
involvement in making payments to the AUC and, if so, under what theory of 
liability. It must be remembered that corporations are operated by human beings 
and that even if the corporation cannot be held liable, the individuals acting on 
its behalf can.65 
IV WHAT CHARGES CAN BE BROUGHT? 
A Article 25(3)(d) 
The Communication submitted to the ICC suggests that the Prosecutor 
investigate possible crimes committed by Chiquita employees with individual 
criminal liability based primarily on art 25(3)(d)(ii) and secondarily on arts 
25(3)(d)(i) and 25(3)(c).66 Liability under art 25(3)(d) requires a showing of 
three objective and two subjective elements:67  
The objective elements are:  
(i) a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is attempted or committed; (ii) the 
commission or attempted commission of such a crime was carried out by a group 
of persons acting with a common purpose; (iii) the individual contributed to the 
crime in any way other than those set out in Article 25(3)(a) to (c) of the 
Statute.68  
The subjective elements are:  
(i) the contribution shall be intentional; and (ii) shall either (a) be made with the 
aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group; or (b) in 
the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.69  
Each element will be considered in turn in an effort to evaluate whether the 
Office of the Prosecutor should invest time and resources into investigating 
Chiquita’s actions. 
Not surprisingly, a common element of both modes of liability, detailed in art 
25(3)(d), is the requirement that a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC was 
attempted or committed.70 This is relevant with regard to Chiquita because 
Colombia’s art 124 declaration could prevent the ICC from charging employees 
of Chiquita with war crimes. The conduct complained of in the Communication 
                                                 
 64 Desislava Stoitchkova, Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law 
(Intersentia, 2010) 102.  
 65 Kaeb, above n 41, 374. See also Kremnitzer, above n 28, 911.  
 66 The Communication, above n 1, [18].  
 67 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011) [269] 
(‘Mbarushimana Decision’).  
 68 Ibid [269] n 640.  
 69 Ibid.  
 70 Rome Statute art 25(3)(d).  
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occurred between November 2002, when the Rome Statute came into force with 
regard to Colombia, and June 2004, when Chiquita divested itself of its 
Colombian operations, although an argument could be made that money paid by 
Chiquita facilitated the commission of crimes by the AUC until it was disbanded 
in 2006. However, the art 124 declaration precludes the ICC from charging 
individuals with war crimes allegedly committed by Colombian nationals or on 
Colombian territory that occurred before 1 November 2009. The temporal bar to 
bringing war crimes charges is clearly met; it is indisputable that the AUC’s 
alleged activities happened before 1 November 2009. Further, all of the crimes 
alleged against the AUC are thought to have been committed in Colombia. 
Therefore, Colombia’s art 124 declaration prevents the ICC from prosecuting 
any individuals for art 8 crimes committed before 1 November 2009. No bar 
exists to prevent the Office of the Prosecutor from investigating crimes against 
humanity or genocide. 
The ICC has already found evidence suggesting that members of the AUC 
committed crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In its 2012 interim 
report, the ICC identified 10 AUC members that had been convicted in 
Colombian courts of crimes falling under the Rome Statute including murder, 
attempted murder, abduction, forced displacement and child recruitment.71 At 
least six of those 10 were convicted of crimes falling under the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ICC.72 The ICC also more generally found that evidence 
existed indicating that the AUC committed crimes against humanity prior to 
being disbanded.73 This evidence supports a reasonable suspicion that crimes 
proscribed by the Rome Statute were committed or attempted. 
The second objective element requires a showing that the crimes falling under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC were committed or attempted by a group of people 
acting with a common purpose. A group is defined as ‘two or more persons’.74 A 
group can exist without being incorporated into a military, political or 
administrative structure.75 Human Rights Watch described the AUC as a well-
organised coalition made up of separate paramilitary groups with some form of 
command structure.76 Additionally, the AUC was designated as a ‘Foreign 
Terrorist Organization’ by the US in 2001.77 These findings are sufficient to 
conclude that the AUC was a group, at least for the purposes of a preliminary 
investigation. 
                                                 
 71 Colombian Interim Report, above n 9, 72–4.  
 72 Ibid.  
 73 Ibid.  
 74 Mbarushimana Decision (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-
01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011) [271], quoting Prosecutor v Dyilo (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007) [343].  
 75 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) (International 
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014) [1626] 
(‘Katanga Judgment’).  
 76 Human Rights Watch, ‘The “Sixth Division”: Military–Paramilitary Ties and US Policy in 
Colombia’ (Report, 2001) 13, 15 (‘The Sixth Division’); Human Rights Watch, ‘Smoke and 
Mirrors: Colombia’s Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups’ (Research Report, August 
2005) 3, 13–14 (‘Smoke and Mirrors’).  
 77 Powell, above n 18.  
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A common purpose need not be predefined before it is carried out; it can arise 
extemporaneously and be inferred from the actions of the group.78 It also does 
not have to carry an exclusively criminal purpose, but the common plan must 
have some criminal purpose, and the intent to achieve that criminal purpose must 
be shared by the members of the group.79 The apparent overarching goal of the 
AUC was to exert territorial control over parts of Colombia, largely for the 
purpose of cultivating coca, trafficking in cocaine and transporting weapons.80 
This was achieved by forcefully expelling left wing guerrilla groups, including 
FARC-EP, from parts of the country and by committing acts of violence against 
the civilian population.81 Generally speaking, this evidence supports a reasonable 
belief that the AUC, acting as a group, committed crimes falling under the Rome 
Statute pursuant to a common plan. This evidence fulfils the second objective 
element of art 25(3)(d). 
The last objective element requires a showing that the accused contributed to 
the crime in a way not described in arts 25(3)(a)–(c). This element represents the 
greatest impediment to any effort to hold employees of Chiquita accountable for 
atrocity crimes at the ICC. The ICC has found that not all types of assistance are 
sufficient for an individual to be liable under art 25(3)(d) but that the accused 
must have made a significant contribution to the commission of the crime.82 A 
significant contribution is one that has a bearing on the occurrence of the crime 
or the manner of its commission.83 A determination as to the extent of an 
accused’s contribution to the criminal activity is reached by considering the 
accused ‘person’s relevant conduct and the context in which this conduct is 
performed’.84 Factors to be considered in this respect are:  
(i) the sustained nature of the participation after acquiring knowledge of the 
criminality of the group’s common purpose, (ii) any efforts made to prevent 
criminal activity or to impede the efficient functioning of the group’s crimes, (iii) 
whether the person creates or merely executes the criminal plan, (iv) the position 
of the suspect in the group or relative to the group and (v) perhaps most 
importantly, the role the suspect played vis-à-vis the seriousness and scope of the 
crimes committed.85  
A case by case analysis is necessary to determine whether a person’s 
contribution was significant enough to support a finding of criminal liability 
under art 25(3)(d).86 
                                                 
 78 Katanga Judgment (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-
01/07, 7 March 2014) [1626].  
 79 Ibid [1627].  
 80 Smoke and Mirrors, above n 76, 1.  
 81 The Sixth Division, above n 76, 10–11, 18–19, 25–6, 40–6, 48–50.  
 82 Katanga Judgment (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-
01/07, 7 March 2014) [1632]; Mbarushimana Decision (International Criminal Court, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011) [283].  
 83 Katanga Judgment (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-
01/07, 7 March 2014) [1633].  
 84 Mbarushimana Decision (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-
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 85 Ibid [284] (citations omitted).  
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With regard to the first factor identified by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (‘Mbarushimana’), the evidence shows that 
Chiquita continued to make payments to the AUC for several years after learning 
that it was engaged in criminal activity. Chiquita knew of the AUC’s criminality 
no later than September 2000 and continued to make payments to it until 
February 2004.87 This demonstrates Chiquita’s sustained participation in the 
activities of the AUC. There is no evidence to suggest that Chiquita did anything 
to interrupt the AUC’s criminal activities as required under the second factor. 
Additionally, the third factor is inoperative in this case as Chiquita did not create 
or execute the common plan attributed to the AUC. The fourth factor also does 
not appear particularly relevant because Chiquita was not a member of the AUC 
and its position relative to the group was that of minor financial benefactor. 
 As to the fifth factor, the Communication argues that the USD1.7 million 
Chiquita paid to the AUC constituted a ‘significant contribution’ to the AUC’s 
criminal activity.88 Without knowing the full extent of the AUC’s assets during 
the relevant period, it is believed that by 2002 the AUC controlled 40 per cent of 
Colombian cocaine trafficking and had an annual income of approximately 
USD100 million.89 Therefore, the USD1.7 million paid to the AUC between 
1997 and 2004 averages out to annual payments of USD242 815.14, or less than 
one quarter of one per cent of the AUC’s annual income. Based on the financial 
numbers alone, it is difficult to believe that the money being paid by Chiquita 
constituted a significant contribution to the AUC’s activities. In particular, the 
contribution of such a small portion of the overall annual income of the group 
suggests that the money paid by Chiquita did not significantly contribute to the 
scope of the group’s activities. However, without knowing precisely how the 
AUC used the money it received from Chiquita, it is impossible to entirely rule 
out the possibility that it did constitute a significant contribution. 
The evidence, as it is currently known, indicates that Chiquita continued to 
pay money to the AUC even after learning of its criminality, which would seem 
to fulfil the first factor. However, the money paid by Chiquita represented such a 
small portion of the AUC’s overall annual income that it likely had little impact 
on the seriousness and the scope of the group’s activities, suggesting that the 
fifth factor has not been met. The other three factors are of little relevance to this 
particular inquiry. Therefore, it remains unclear whether Chiquita’s payments to 
the AUC constituted a significant contribution to its criminality. It must be noted 
that these factors are meant to assist in the analysis of the accused’s contribution 
but are not meant to be determinative on their own.90 
Determining the significance of Chiquita’s contribution is made no easier by 
the fact that there is no evidence linking the money paid by Chiquita directly to 
the AUC’s criminal acts. Further, it seems doubtful that such information will 
                                                 
 87 United States of America, ‘Factual Proffer’, Submission in United States of America v 
Chiquita Brands International Inc, No 07-cr-00055, 19 March 2007 (DC Cir, 2007) [1]–[2]. 
 88 The Communication, above n 1, [21].  
 89 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru’ 
(2005) 25(2) Journal of Conflict Studies 104, 107 n 12; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and 
War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003) 72, 74.  
 90 Mbarushimana Decision (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-
01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011) [284].  
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come to light, as it is unlikely that records exist detailing the accounting practices 
of a criminal organisation that has been defunct for more than a decade. The 
absence of such evidence is significant as, without it, it will be very difficult to 
show that the contribution made by Chiquita rose to the level of significance 
intended by the drafters to give rise to individual liability. As the Trial Chamber 
pointed out in Prosecutor v Katanga (‘Katanga Judgment’), what is important is 
that the identified contribution has an effect on the ‘realisation of the crime’.91 In 
Mbarushimana, the ICC explained that without the substantial contribution 
requirement, any member of the community that provided assistance to a 
criminal organisation in any form could be exposed to liability so long as he or 
she was aware of the organisation’s criminal purpose.92 Without evidence 
connecting the money paid by Chiquita to the AUC’s criminal activity, it will be 
very difficult to satisfy this element. This raises the question of whether it is 
worth the ICC’s money and effort to pursue this case. 
The first subjective element of art 25(3)(d) also involves the contribution of 
the accused. It demands that the act performed by the accused must be 
intentional.93 Within this context, the Trial Chamber in the Katanga Judgment 
took pains to make clear that it must be shown that the accused intended to 
commit the act that contributed to the crime; it is not necessary to show that the 
accused shared the group’s intention of committing the crime itself.94 Article 
30(2) defines the requisite degree of intent to mean that the person ‘means to 
engage in the conduct’.95 The ICC in the Katanga Judgment found that this 
definition has two elements: the accused’s actions must have been deliberate and 
must be done with awareness of what he or she was doing.96 To satisfy this 
element it need only be shown that Chiquita was aware it was making payments 
to the AUC and that it was doing so deliberately. Based on that rather low bar it 
is easy to conclude that the payments made by Chiquita employees to the AUC 
were made intentionally. Chiquita knew no later than 2000 that its payments 
were going to the AUC.97 The payments were initially ‘reviewed and approved’ 
by senior executives at Chiquita.98 Beginning in June 2002, the method of 
payment was changed and Chiquita began using a high ranking officer in 
Banadex to make direct cash payments to the AUC.99 Further, the payments 
being made to the AUC were discussed during a meeting of the Audit Committee 
of the Board of Directors.100 This evidence all suggests that Chiquita was aware 
                                                 
 91 Katanga Judgment (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04-
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it was deliberately making payments to the AUC, supporting a finding that the 
payments were made intentionally. 
The final element of art 25(3)(d) liability requires a showing of one of two 
things: either the contribution being made by the accused was being done ‘with 
the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group’; or in 
the knowledge that the group intended to commit the crime.101 This is thought to 
mean that the accused must specifically intend to promote or encourage the acts 
of the group through his or her actions.102 At present, there is no evidence to 
support a reasonable suspicion that Chiquita’s employees made payments to the 
AUC for the purpose of furthering the AUC’s criminal activities or criminal 
purpose. Chiquita conceded that it made the payments, but that it did so under 
threat and that it feared that non-payment could result in violence against its 
employees and property.103 This could constitute duress, which is one of the 
grounds for excluding criminal liability under art 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, 
although it is somewhat debatable whether Chiquita’s employees would be able 
to make an effective evidentiary showing to that effect.104 To successfully prove 
duress, the accused must demonstrate that their criminal activity was necessary 
to avoid the threat — ie that they had no choice other than to commit the 
crime.105 It would be difficult for the Chiquita officials to make such a showing 
as they did have a choice to avoid the effects of the threat; Chiquita could have 
divested itself of its Colombian banana holdings when payment was first 
demanded by the AUC. It is more likely that Chiquita made the payments so that 
it might be left alone by the AUC and continue to profit from its Colombian 
banana business. However, whether the Chiquita officials will be able to prove 
duress is somewhat beside the point as there is still no evidence linking the 
payments made by Chiquita to the furtherance of the AUC’s criminal activities. 
Unless contrary evidence is discovered indicating that Chiquita made the 
payments with that purpose in mind it will be very difficult to prove this element. 
Article 25(3)(d)(ii) entails a lesser evidentiary showing than art 25(3)(d)(i) as 
it only necessitates evidence that the accused made his or her contribution 
knowing that the crime was going to be committed rather than demanding that 
the accused act with the goal of furthering the commission of the crime. The 
difficulty with fulfilling this element has to do with how the term ‘the crime’ 
should be understood as used in the Rome Statute. Referring to ‘the crime’, 
rather than ‘a crime’ suggests that, for liability to arise under art 25(3)(d)(ii), the 
accused must know that his or her contribution will assist in the completion of a 
specific crime and not contribute to the commission of any crime.106 This is also 
the only instance of the term ‘the crime’ being used in this way in art 25. In other 
similar contexts, the phrase ‘a crime’ is used instead. The different usage here 
suggests an intention on the part of the drafters to distinguish the evidentiary 
showing required under art 25(3)(d)(ii). If the subsection is read in this way, it 
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will be much more difficult for the ICC to find that the Chiquita corporate 
officials are criminally liable. There is no evidence to suggest that the AUC was 
communicating its criminal intentions to Chiquita’s employees so as to make 
them aware that the money paid by Chiquita was funding specific criminal 
activity. In fact, there is no evidence linking the payments made by Chiquita to 
any criminal activity at all. The money being paid by Chiquita could just as 
easily have been used to feed or house members of the AUC or for some other 
purpose unrelated to the AUC’s criminal activity. Without evidence 
demonstrating that Chiquita knew that its money was being used to fund atrocity 
crimes, there can be no liability under art 25(3)(d)(ii). 
B Article 25(3)(c) 
In addition to alleging possible art 25(3)(d) liability against Chiquita 
employees, the Communication also suggests possible art 25(3)(c) liability.107 
Article 25(3)(c) is an issue yet to be litigated before any of the Chambers of the 
ICC. Article 25(3)(c) is the Rome Statute’s provision relating to aiding and 
abetting and requires a showing that: 
1 A crime proscribed under the Rome Statute was committed or 
attempted; 
2 The accused aided, abetted or otherwise assisted in the crime’s 
commission or attempted commission, including providing the 
means for its commission; and 
3 The accused acted for the purpose of facilitating that crime.108  
The first of these elements is analogous to the first objective element of art 
25(3)(d), and the analysis of that element is equally applicable here. The second 
element of art 25(3)(c) mandates that the accused aided, abetted or otherwise 
assisted in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes identified 
under the first element. Although aiding and abetting are often referred to 
together in criminal law, art 25(3)(c) is disjunctive and it can be fulfilled upon a 
showing that the accused participated in any of the three activities listed therein. 
In international law ‘aiding’ typically constitutes ‘some form of physical 
assistance in the commission of the crime’, although some definitions include 
assistance in the form of moral support.109 Abetting is more passive and is 
achieved through ‘exhortation or encouragement’ to commit the crime.110 The 
term ‘otherwise assisted’ does not appear to have a set meaning but acts as a 
catch-all phrase for any behaviour that is not encompassed by aiding or abetting. 
It is not sufficient under customary international law to simply show that a 
person assisted, offered moral support or encouraged the commission of a crime 
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for liability to arise under art 25(3)(c).111 It is well established in the case law of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ad hoc Tribunals’) that any acts 
constituting aiding, abetting or another form of assistance must have a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crime.112 While a general consensus exists that a 
substantial effect is necessary to prove aiding and abetting, there has been some 
disagreement about what is required to prove that the accused’s actions 
constitute a substantial effect. In Prosecutor v Perišić (‘Perišić’), the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found 
that, for the acts of the accused to meet the substantial effect requirement, they 
must be specifically directed towards assisting in the commission of the crimes 
committed by the principal perpetrators.113 The purpose of the specific direction 
requirement was to establish ‘a culpable link between assistance provided by an 
accused individual and the crimes of the principle perpetrators’.114 The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (‘Special Court’) later rejected this analysis in Prosecutor 
v Taylor. There, the Appeals Chamber found that neither customary international 
law nor the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone required a showing of 
specific direction.115 The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia followed that decision in Prosecutor v 
Šainović, and rejected the holding in Perišić, concluding that for an effect to be 
substantial the accused must have ‘the knowledge that [his or her] acts assist the 
commission of the offense’.116 It also agreed with the Special Court to the extent 
that the specific direction requirement conflicts with customary international 
law.117 This leads to the conclusion that it is not necessary to prove specific 
direction when establishing that the assistance provided by the individual 
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accused of aiding and abetting had a substantial effect on the commission of the 
principle crimes. 
It is unclear whether the substantial effect requirement will be applied at the 
ICC, although many believe that it will.118 While the Rome Statute generally 
follows customary international law, there are some areas in which it departs by 
creating new law or modifying existing law.119 Customary international law is 
only considered a secondary source of law at the ICC and therefore it is not 
required to mechanically transfer the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals into 
its own case law.120 This ability to depart from customary international law is 
reflected in art 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute which, unlike the law applied at the 
ad hoc Tribunals, contains a stronger mens rea requirement at the expense of a 
diminished actus reus standard.121 Because the ICC applies a diminished actus 
reus standard when compared to the ad hoc Tribunals and customary 
international law, it is possible that the substantial contribution requirement will 
be discarded when aiding and abetting is considered by the ICC. Whether the 
ICC applies the substantial effect requirement is ultimately of no real 
importance, so long as some element of art 25(3)(c) obliges the prosecution to 
demonstrate a connection between the accused’s activities and the commission of 
the atrocity crimes to which he or she is alleged to have contributed. 
The final element of art 25(3)(c) liability establishes the heightened mens rea 
requirement and necessitates that the accused acted with the purpose of 
facilitating the crime. It is believed that some form of specific intent is required 
to fulfil this element meaning that it has a mens rea requirement that exceeds that 
found in art 30.122 This is thought to be a vital criterion, particularly with regard 
to aiding and assisting, as those acts can often encompass innocent actions 
performed without knowledge of the principal perpetrator’s intentions.123 To 
meet the requirements of art 25(3)(c) one must act with the purposeful will to 
bring about the crime or to assist in its commission.124 Mere awareness that 
one’s actions will result in assisting in the commission of a crime is not 
sufficient to support liability under art 25(3)(c).125 
This mens rea element shares much in common with the subjective element 
found in art 25(3)(d)(i), as it also requires evidence that the accused acted with 
the purpose of enabling the commission of the crimes and will require a similar 
evidentiary showing. There is little reason to believe that the demands of this 
element can be met with regard to Chiquita. The evidence indicates that Chiquita 
made payments to the AUC to avoid threatened acts of violence and not for the 
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purpose of facilitating the AUC’s crimes.126 Further, there is nothing to suggest a 
direct link between the money paid by Chiquita and the human rights violations 
committed by the AUC. The mere supposition that because Chiquita paid money 
to the AUC, and the AUC in turn committed atrocity crimes means that 
Chiquita’s money was used to fund the commission of those crimes, is 
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that Chiquita employees acted with 
the purpose of facilitating those crimes. For these reasons, it is highly unlikely 
that an investigation into Chiquita’s activities in Colombia will lead to the 
conclusion that charges can be brought against its employees. 
V CONCLUSION 
This analysis highlights how difficult it is under the Rome Statute to apportion 
liability to corporate actors for their contributions made to the commission of 
crimes falling under the Rome Statute. Liability against corporate entities is not 
included in the Rome Statute and, even if the ICC could prosecute corporations, 
it would be extremely difficult to overcome the complementarity concerns or to 
compel corporations to involve themselves in the proceedings. The Rome Statute 
does make it possible to hold corporate employees responsible for actions 
committed while in the employ of a corporation. However, it will often be 
difficult to find evidence necessary to support a finding that the corporate 
employees had the requisite intent or knowledge to lead to liability for their 
actions. 
This analysis also demonstrates that the situation involving Chiquita is 
probably not the right opportunity to expand the ICC’s focus to include actions 
committed by corporate employees. The lack of any direct connection between 
the money Chiquita paid to the AUC and the AUC’s criminal activity, the fact 
that the payments were likely the result of duress and the fractional amount 
Chiquita contributed to the AUC’s overall assets all indicate that it will be very 
difficult to build a successful prosecution in this case. If the ICC wishes to 
investigate and prosecute individual corporate actors for their involvement in 
human rights abuses, which it should, there are better cases than this to achieve 
that goal. Although impunity should never be allowed to prevail, it is necessary 
that the ICC be regarded as legitimate to be able to effectively combat impunity. 
At this stage, an unsuccessful prosecution of corporate employees could 
undermine that legitimacy, making it more difficult for the ICC to conduct these 
sorts of investigations and prosecutions in the future. 
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